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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LA RENE HOLMES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
P. C. HEIDEBRECHT,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
This is an appeal by plaintiff from a verdict of a
jury in favor of defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The accident involves an automobile-pedestrian
accident which occurred on the 12th day of September,
1957, at about 8:00 o'clock A.M. on 12th Street in Ogden,
Utah. There is little conflict in the evidence.
Plaintiff resided in the family home situate on the
North side of 12th Street approximately 525 feet West
of Washington Boulevard. Twelfth Street extends in
an easterly and westerly direction.
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The Holmes' own a considerable portion of land
bordering on the North side of said street. There are
no street intersections between Washington Boulevard
and Wall Avenue and there are no marked pedestrian
lanes across 12th Street. The only way they could cross
in a pedestrian lane would require walking easterly to
Washington Boulevard, a distance of 525 feet, or westerly
to Wall A venue which is several blocks to the West.
There is an irrigation ditch extending along the
South side of 12th Street, South of the sidewalk, which
furnishes water for the irrigation of the Holmes' property as well as other property owners in the vicinity.
The Holmes maintain a headgate in this ditch in front
of the Sorensen house located on the South about 40
feet West of the entrance to their home. Their water
is transported across 12th Street by an underground
pipe. Twelfth Street is 42 feet wide from curb to curb
with a black-top covering about 18 or 19 feet wide extending down the center leaving a gravel strip of about
9.5 feet on each side which is readily available for travel.
There is no painted line dividing the street (see photos,
defendant's Exhibits 1 and 2).
On the morning of Septen1ber 12th, at about 7 :45
o'clock A.l\I., plaintiff proceeded frmn her home driveway southerly direct to the headgate to see if the boards
had been re1noved fron1 the headgate. Upon ascertaining
that they had been renloYed, she then was standing on
the South sidewalk at at a point 1narked "X" (defendants Exhibit 2). She looked to the East. saw a car,
which she recognized as the water 1naster's, proceeding
easterly son1e distance to the East and sa"· no cars in
2
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the immediate vicinity proceeding westerly. She then
looked to the West and seeing no car approaching in the
immediate vicinity, she stepped from the sidewalk, across
the curb and then proceeded in a northeasterly direction
toward her driveway. The distance from curb along
this diagonal line is 50 feet. When she had reached a
point near the center of the highway she was struck by
defendant's car which was proceeding easterly on 12th
Street. She was struck by the right headlight of defendant's car. No warning of any kind was given by dedendant. Plaintiff sustained very serious injuries. The
street was clear, the road dry, there was nothing in the
street to interfere with defendant's vision. He, therefore, had a clear and unobstructed view of plaintiff from
the time she stepped from the sidewalk until she reached
the point of contact.
Officer Anderson arrived at the scene of the accident
shortly after it occurred. He made a careful inspection
and located the point of contact as being 18 feet 4 inches
North of the South curb on a direct line which would put
plaintiff 2 feet 8 inches or one step South of the center
and measured along the diagonal line she had travelled
about 22 feet 4 inches after stepping from the sidewalk
to the South curb so tliat she had walked better than 25
feet in plain view of defendant as he proceeded along
said roadway.
Defendant testified that he had arrived in Ogden
only two days before the accident and that he was looking for a mail box to post a card to his family. Whatever
he was doing he certainly was not looking ahead for
pedestrians on the roadway as he stated he did not see
3
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plaintiff until the moment of impact.
Plaintiff was thrown upon the hood, carried some
distance and then thrown violently to the roadway some
distance to the East of the point of contact. She was
lying on the blacktop portion of the street with her head
to the North. Defendant testified he was travelling at
about 25 miles per hour.
It is clearly established that inas1nuch as plaintiff
was struck by the right headlight that defendant's car
was proceeding easterly over the centerline of the unmarked street.
Officer Bennett, a qualified expert, testified that he
had checked the walking speed of n1any women and that
the average walking speed is 4.11 feet per second. Plaintiff was 54 years of age, a large woman, weighing about
195 pounds and she testified that she walked at her
normal gait. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude
that she was walking at probably a slower speed than
the average.
Officer Bennett further testified that if plaintiff
walked 23 feet at 4.11 feet per second and defendant's
car was poceeding at the rate of 25 miles per hour he
would travel 36 2/3 feet per second. Therefore, defendant's car would have been at least 205.29 feet West of
the point of contact when plaintiff left the curb. He
further testified that defendant could have stopped his
car, including reaction ti1ne, in 53.49 feet. In other
words, defendant could have stopped his car at any
tin1e before reaching a point 53...!9 feet fr01n the point
of contact and he could thereby have avoided the accident
and, of course, he could haYe turned his car to the right
4
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and avoided striking the plaintiff when much closer than
53.49 feet had he been looking ahead for pedestrians.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 8.
2. The court erred in denying plaintiff's motion
for a new trial.
ARGUMENT
Appellant's principal argument relates to the court's
Instruction No. 8 as follows :
"The laws of the State of Utah require that
every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point
other than within a marked cross-walk or within
an unmarked cross-walk at an intersection shall
yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the
roadway. If you find that at the time and place
of the accident involved in this lawsuit the plaintiff, LaRene Holmes, was not crossing the roadway at a marked or unmarked crosswalk and if
you further find that she failed to yield the rightof-way to the defendant's vehicle then you will
find such conduct on her part to be negligence."
We contend that this instruction should not have
been given for the following reasons :
A. It is an incorrect statement of the law.
B. It is a so-called formula instruction argumentive
in nature and fails to set out the principle of law applicable to the issues impartially as to both plaintiff and
defendant.
C.

Said instruction following immediately after
5
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Instruction No. 7 tends to mislead or confuse the jury.
D. It is inconsistent and contradictory to Instruction No. 7.
E. It gives undue prominence to the so-called rightof-way.
We will discuss these points in the order above set
forth although there will no doubt be some overlapping
in our general discussion.
A. The court fully, correctly and adequately instructed the jury on all issues raised by the pleadings,
absent Instruction No. 8. Instruction No. 7 is taken from
Utah Jury Instructions Form No. 20.8. It correctly sets
forth in clear and understandable language the duty imposed upon apedestrian who crosses a public high,vay at
an unmarked point on the highway. Instruction No. 7,
paragraph 2 says:
"If she crosses at any other place the law requires her to yield the right-of-way to all vehicles
on the roadway so near as to constitute an immediate hazard, aithough this requirement does
not, relieve the driver of a vehicle fron1 the duty
to exercise ordinary care for the safety of any
pedestrian upon an~~ roadway."
Then in Instruction No. 8 the court tells the jury that
the laws of the State of Utah require every pedestrian
crossing a roadway at any point other than within a
nmrked cross-walk to yield the right-of-way to all vehicles
upon the roadway. There is a vast difference between
yidding the right-of-way to vehicles on the roadway so
near a~ to constitute an iln1nediate hazard (Instruction
No. 7) and a duty to yield the right-of-way to all vehicles
6
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upon the roadway (Instruction No. 8). We admit that
this is the language of the statute yet to merely quote
the statute without some explanation as to its meaning
leaves the jury bewildered and confused.
We invite the court's attention to the case of
Collins vs. Lindell, 67 Utah 476, 247 Pac. 476. This case
involves an intersection crossing. The statute which
applied was as follows :
"An operator of a vehicle shall have the rightof-way over the operator of another vehicle who
is approaching from the left in an intersecting or
connecting highway and shall give the right-ofway to an operator of a vehicle approaching him
from the right at an intersecting or connecting
highway."
In this case, like our own, it became the duty of the
court to interpret to the jury the meaning of this language. Plaintiff requested the court to instruct the jury
as to the meaning of this statute which the court refused
to do. The requested instruction is fully set out on page
479· of the Pacific Reporter. The court, however, gave
an instruction (No. 7) and the question was whether or
not the court committed error in refusing to give the
requested instruction which defined the statute and
limited its application to means that the right-of-way applies only where the travellers or vehicles on intersecting streets approach the crossing so nearly at the same
time at such rates of speed that if both proceeded each
without regard for the other a collision is reasonably
to be apprehended. This court held that the court
should have given this instruction and that failure to do
so constititued reversible error notwithstanding the giv7
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ing of Instruction No. 7.
We quote from Mr. Justice Thurman
"In the opinion of the writer the statute contemplates that whenever there is reasonable
grounds to doubt whether it is safe to attempt to
cross an intersecting highway in front of a driver
on the right, the driver on the left should yield
the right-of-way."
In other words, the mere quoting of the statutes without
qualifying and limiting its meaning constitutes prejudicial error. So in our case, the vice of Instruction No. 8
is clearly demonstrated in this that the court failed to
tell the jury what is meant by the words
" ... yield the right-of-way to a vehicle upon
the roadway."
What the learned trial judge in effect told the jury
was that if a person crossed a public highway at an
unmarked point he must yield the right-of-way to all
vehicles upon the roadway and that failure to do so
constituted negligence as a matter of law.
We cannot conceive of anything more confusing to
a jury that to tell them that it is the duty of pedestrian
in crossing at an un1narked crosswalk to yield the rightof-way to all vehicles upon tlze roadzcay. Notwithstanding this statute, when correctly interpreted, as
done in Instruction No., 7. does not require a pedestrian
to yield the right-of-way to all Yehicles upon the roadway but what it does require is that the pedestrian must
yield the right-of-way to all vehicles on the roadway
approaching so ncar as to constitute an immediate hazzard. Literally, the meaning of Instruction No. 8, with-
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out qualification, would mean that no person could ever
cross a highway at any point other than in a marked
way and in our case it would be negligence, says the
crosswalk because there are always cars upon the roadcourt, if a car was on 12th Street at any point between
Wall Avenue and Washington Boulevard and plaintiff
would be guilty of negligence as a matter of law if she
attempted to cross the highway. Such is not and cannot
be the law, irrespective of the language of the statute.
It might be argued that in view of the fact that
the court correctly instructed the jury in Instruction No.
7, that this error is not prejudicial. Our answer is
found in the case of

Sorensen v. Bell, 51 Utah 263, 170 Pac. 72 wherein
the court says in discussing an erroneous instruction
"True, counsel point to other portions of the
charge wherein they contend the rule respecting
the burden of proof is correctly stated. If that
be conceded, it still does not minimize, much less
correct the palpable error contained in the foregoing instruction."
And Mr. Chief Justice Crockett in the recent case of
I vie v. Richardson, 336 P. 2d 718 at page 786 says:
"It is conceded that the issues of contributorv
negligence was properly covered in the next i:r{struction. This, however, pitted one instruction
against the other and might have been confusing
to the jury."

The test for correctness of an instruction is how it will
naturally be understood by the average men composing
juries.
9
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See 88 C. J. S., Page 890
and a large number of cases cited in the notes and again
at page 894 that author says:
"The test for the correctness of an instruction
does not lie in the indulgence which a lawyer in
his office with the aid of his books or the trial
and appellate courts with the benfit of briefs and
arguments of counsel give to instructions but as
to how the instruction will naturally be understood by the average men composing juries."
and at page 897 the author further says:
"It is proper to refuse and error to give conflicting instructions on a material point since a
charge containing two distinct propositions conflicting with each other tends so to confuse the
jury as to prevent their rendition of an intelligent
verdict."
We further contend that the second paragraph of
Instruction No. 8 is also an incorrect statement of the
law wherein the court instructs the jury that if they find
that plaintiff failed to yield the right-of-way then you
will find such conduct on her part to be negligence. This
is equivalent to a directed verdict. The instruction does
not tell the jury that they may find the plaintiff guilty
of negligence but it says that they must find the plaintiff guilty of negligence.
In the case of
l\1orrison v. Peery, 194 Utah 151, 140 P. 2d T/:2 in
discussing this question of whether or not the violation
of a rule of the road is negligence as a matter of law,
says:
10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"The presumption of negligence on the part
of defendant arising from auto collision on defendant's wrong side of the road (violation of the
statute) ceases the moment an explanation is offered, but the evidence upon which the presumption is based remains in the case and is to be
considered by the jury unless there is no confljct
between such evidence and the explanatory evidence."
In other words, as we understand it, the mere violation
of a rule of the road statute does not co.nstitute negligence per se. It merely raises a presumption of negligence.
Instruction No. 8 is a good example of this presumption. In Instruction No. 7 the court tells the jury
that a pedestrian must yield the right-of-way to all
vehicles on the roadway approaching so near as to constitute an immediate hazard and then is subdivision 3
of Instruction 7 the court says the amount of caution
required to constitute ordinary care increases, as does
the danger that a reasonably prudent person in like
position would apprehend in this situation. In other
words, the question should be left to the jury to determine whether or not, under the facts as disclosed the
plaintiff acted as a reasonably prudent person would
act in crossing a street when a car was approaching at
rate of 25 miles per hour ba:ck a distance of better than
200 feet was guilty of negligence proximately causing or
contributing to her injuries.
B. We again refer to Mr. Chief Justice Crockett's
opinion in the I vie v. Richardson case, supra, wherein
he refers to Instruction No. 4 and says :
11
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"The above instruction taken by itself is in
error because it fails to take into account the
possible contributory negligence of the plaintiff.
This kind of an instruction sometimes referred
to as a formula instruction which makes a recital
in accordance with the contention of the party
and ends with the conclusion and if you so find
then your verdict must be for the party is not
generally a good type of instruction to give. This
is so because it lends itself to the error just noted
and also because it tends to be argumentive rather
than to set out the principles of law applicable to
the issues impartially as to both parties for such
reasons it is better to avoid giving instructions of
that type."
C. We have already discussed how the giving of
Instruction No. 8 immediately following Instruction No.
7 would tend to mislead or confuse the jury.
D. We have also discussed how Instruction No. 8
is inconsistent and contradictory to Instruction No. 7.
E.. Instruction No. 7 correctly informed the jury as
to the respective duties of pedestrians crossing a highway on a unmarked crossing and also the duty of the
driver of the approaching vehicle and the court having
given this instruction together with Instruction No. g,
it seems to us that the issues were fully and fairly presented and that the giving of additional Instruction
No. 8 gave undue prominence to the alleged contributory
negligence of the plaintiff.

88 C. J. S., Page 903 says:
"It is error to give and ilnproper to refuse
instructions which unduly e1nphasize issues,
theories, defenses, particular evidence, specific
12
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or assumed facts or burden of proof whether by
repetition or by singling them out and making
them unduly prominent."
2. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. We realize
that a trial court has considerable discretion in granting or denying a motion for a new trial and that this
court will reverse the trial court only upon the showing
of an abuse of discretion. It is our view, however, that
this case presents a situation where the refusal of the
trial court to grant a new trial does constitute an abuse
of discretion. It must be remembered that there is little
conflict in the evidence and it is our contention that
this verdict was contrary both as to law and the
evidence. This subject is discussed in
66 C. J. S. starting at Page 200.
We will quote a few general statements fr01n the above
text.
At page 206 the author says:
"Generally speaking it is grounds for new
trial that the verdict is contrary to the evidence
or tothe weight of the evidence providing there
is substantial evidence adduced to support a
verdict contrary to the one returned and the trial
court has the power and the duty to determine
whether a verdict should be set aside and a new
trial granted on this ground."
At Page 211 the author says:
"A new trial may be permissable or required
where the verdict is so contrary to the evidence
or to the weight of the evidence as to indicate
that the jury were influenced by passion, pre13
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judice or other improper motive even in passing
on the creditability of instructions notwithstanding there is some evidence in favor of the prevailing party."
Again at Page 222 the author says:
"As as general rule a verdict rendered contrary to or in disregard of evidence which was
not improper or inconsistent and was not contradicted or discredited will be set aside and a
new trial granted . . . Where even opposing interests are deducible from uncontradicted probative facts the court may draw inferences opposed to the inferences accepted by the jury and
may thus resolve the conflicting inferences in
favor of the party moving for a new trial."
This is not a case where a pedestrian suddenly and
without warning steps from behind a parked automobile
or in the line of an approaching car in the nighttime such
as
Mingus v. Olson, 114 Utah 585, 201 P. 2d 495;
Cox v. Thompson, Utah, 254 P. 2d 1047;
Smith v. Bennett,
Utah , 265 P. 2nd 401.
This is a case where the defendant in broad daylight
with an unobstructed clear view ahead strikes a pedestrian when she has reached within one step of the
center of the highway after having travelled in plain
view a distance of nearly 25 feet. The defendant travelling only 25 miles per hour.
It see1ns inconceivable to us that under that factual
situation a jury could have returned a Yerdict in favor
of the defendant. We can account for it only on the
theory that the jury either 1nisunderstood the instruct14
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ions or else for s01ne unaccountable reason returned a
verdict through passion or prejudice.
Mr. Justice McDonough, in the recent case of
Winn v. Read,
Utah , 335 P. 2d 627,
in commenting on the facts presented in that case, says:
"If, as a matter of fact, the horseman,
though on the wrong side of the road, did travel
for 30 rods, or any substantial distance on the
left hand side of the road, then the defendant
should have observed him and should have
av?ided running into him. If he failed so to do
he was guilty of negligence that was the sole
proximate cause of the collisions."
So in this case, if the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in failing to see the approaching car at least 200
feet away fr~m her yet walking as she did in plain
view for a distance of nearly 25 feet when the driver
could stop within 53.49 feet and failed to make any effort
to avoid the accident, it seems to us that the defendant's
admitted negligence was the sole proximate cause of
the collision and the defendant certainly had the last
clear chance to have avoided the accident.
See Marcellin v. Osguthrope, Utah, 336 P. 2d 779
wherein Mr. Chief Justice Crockett discusses the doctrine of last clear chance. Wherein he states
"Should we accept the other aspects of plaintiff's argument there would still be no basis to
find that defendant had a clear chance to avoid
the accident. There must be, as the phrase implies, a fair and clear chance and not a mere
15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

possibility that one might have avoided the accident by the skin of his teeth."
The undisputed evidence in this case discloses such
a factual situation did not exist. The evidence conclusively shows that the defendant did in fact have a
fair and clear chance to have avoided the accident.
We feel strongly that the trial court committed reversible error in denying plaintiff's motion for a new
trial.
Respectfully submitted,
LeRoy B. Young, of
YOUNG, THATCHER &

GLAS~IANN

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
1018 First Security Bank Building
Ogden, Utah
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